Abstract. -The author has used news articles and editorials published in The New York Times in 1898 to trace the changes in United States opinion about Cuba and the Cubans during that year. The resulting chronology becomes a sounding board for his questioning old verities concerning issues such as the position towards United States intervention in Cuba of the Cuban generals, and the efficacy of the Teller Amendment to the U.S. Congress Joint Resolution of April 18, 1898 in preventing the annexation of Cuba by the United States. This article is based on contemporary newspaper articles, documents, and other printed primary sources.
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that from 1895 to 1898 public opinion in the United States supported intervention in Cuba to liberate Cubans from the yoke of Spain. The cause of Cuba's independence from Spain was endorsed by the United States Senate as early as February 1896, when it passed a resolution recognizing the Cuban insurgents as belligerents. 1 In May 1895, José Martí, Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and prospective President of the Cuban Republic in Arms, wrote a letter to the New York Herald from Cuba, where he presented the reasons for the Cuban war of independence, and expressed his hopes that the Cuban cause would be supported by the freedom loving people of the United States, pointing out that an independent Cuba would be open to trade and investment from the Great Republic of the North.
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A long-time resident of the United States, Martí had given from New York City the order for an uprising in Cuba on February 24, 1895 .
What Martí did not say to the Herald was that there was a strong home-rule movement in Cuba, weary of a struggle for independence on account of the fragmented nature of Cuban society -Spanish-born, Cuban-born whites, Cuban-born citizens of African ancestry, and recently freed Africans -and fearful of provoking United States intervention with that armed struggle. A reform program presented by the Cuban-born Minister of Overseas Provinces (Ministro de Ultramar) Buenaventura Abarzuza had been passed by the Spanish cortes (parliament) on February 13. But the uprising of February 24 was used as an excuse not to implement the Abarzuza reforms until the reestablishment of peace by the conservative government formed after the crisis that it brought about in Spain. After the death of Martí on May 19, 1895, the insurgent generals Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo declared a scorched-earth war meant to provoke withdrawal of support for the Spanish monarchy in Cuba, and to deprive the royal government of revenue from Cuban exports. 3 The humane General Arsenio Martínez Campos (1831-1900) was sent to pacify the revolt, but he was defeated by General Antonio Maceo instead. Unwilling to use the same scorched-earth warfare as the insurgents, General Martínez Campos resigned, and suggested that the only officer in the Spanish armed forces capable of dealing in kind with the brutality of the Cuban insurgents was General Valeriano Weyler . The "Invasion" (thus called by the insurgents themselves) of western Cuba by the Cuban Liberation Army from eastern Cuba was indeed an invasion inasmuch as there was a wider difference in mentality, wealth, and ethnic composition between East and West Cuba. These regions also differed in the strength of popular support for insurgency. According to the journalist George Bronson 342 Rafael E. Tarragó Rea, the majority in western Cuba were not in favor of war. 4 "The Cuban insurgents burned fields and mills on plantations which did not pay the contribution that they demanded, releasing the oxen, sacking the shops, and executing those who continued cutting cane or who worked railroad lines", Rea reported. 5 Violence escalated in Cuba on account of General Weyler's policy of participation by the royalist armed forces in the scorched-earth warfare begun by the insurgents, and his policy of forcing the concentration of rural population in cities and villages. Contrary to common opinion, Weyler did not set up concentration camps like those established by the English in South Africa during the Boer War (1900) (1901) (1902) or the United States in the Philippines, nevertheless, the suffering caused by forced relocation, and the deaths caused by hunger and disease resulting from it were devastating. 6 Needless to say, the withholding of the Abarzuza reforms disillusioned many Cuban loyalists, and the implementation of government repression gained adherents to the insurgent cause.
7 General Weyler's policies were successful as far as they broke the insurgent hold on western Cuba, where some of them remained, but as bands without the strength to burn towns which they have had before. The high point of the Weyler offensive was the killing of the Afro-Cuban General Antonio Maceo on December 7, 1896. Alas, the simultaneous death of Francisco Gómez Toro, son of General Máximo Gómez, sowed inside the latter a blind hatred for Spain that was going to have fateful consequences for the cause of the Spanish monarchy in Cuba. 8 While effective militarily, the brutality of General Weyler's methods made the royal government odious to those who suffered from them, and provided the insurgents with greater sup-port both inside and outside Cuba. Spanish atrocities became the daily fare in United States newspapers, and although General Weyler's policies in Cuba were similar to General William Sherman's policies in the United States South during the War between the States, they were highly criticized by the United States government and public opinion. 9 In "The Riots in Havana", on the editorial pages of January 15, The New York Times reports violent protests against the new regime at Havana on January 12. These disturbances were controlled swiftly by Governor General Blanco, but The New York Times described them as a mark of the chronic crisis of Spain, and the failure of home rule in Cuba. Also in this article it is said that not a single insurgent had surrendered, implicitly denying events reported by this newspaper earlier concerning the surrender of some insurgents. This article concludes that the Cuban autonomous government is a farce into which Spanish rule in Cuba had degenerated, and that it was time to consider "the exigency of further action by the United States before the inhabitants of the wretched island had completed its devastation or their mutual extermination." The autonomous government installed on January 2, 1898 was remarkably well-qualified. It was not a group of planters, but a group of intellectuals, lawyers, and men of affairs, like Francisco Zayas, Laureano Rodríguez, Rafael Montoro, and José María Galvez, however, their high professional and human caliber would never be guessed from reading The New York Times.
News reports in The New York Times for the month of February show a thriving new political regime headed by capable men, from Prime Minister Gálvez down. On the front page of the issue for February 7, Mr. Gálvez is quoted saying that there is no crisis in his government, and that it is preparing for elections to be held in order to constitute a Cuban Chamber of Deputies. In its issue of February 23, The New York Times reported the appointment by the autonomous government of Manuel Rafael Angulo as delegate before the United States government to negotiate a commercial treaty. Negative reports in an article of February 23, where Mr. Koop, an American entrepreneur recently returned from Cuba, is quoted saying that home rule was a failure, and that throughout the island business was at a standstill, are contradicted in the same issue, in the article "Cuba Exporting Tobacco", with reports of a recovering Cuban economy. Mr. Dupuy de Lome resigned, and the Spanish government apologized for his behavior, assuring the United States government that it meant to implement the statutes of home rule granted to Cuba. Thus the publication of the Dupuy de Lome letter did not cause the crisis that the Cuban insurgents in the United States wanted. But within a week a greater disaster occurred. On February 15 the U.S. Maine blew up in Havana harbor. A crisis was prevented after the Dupuy de Lome letter affair, but the explosion of the Maine became a casus belli, even when it was never proved that a Spaniard had blown it. On February 16 The New York Times had on its front page the article, "The Maine Blown Up", where it reported the terrible explosion, concluding that none of the wounded men were able to give an explanation.
Could it be a coincidence that these two incidents happened so close the one to the other? The attempt by Cuban insurgents to provoke a conflict between the United States and Spain on February 8 failed.
Could it be that the Cuban insurgents were behind the events of February 15? That was suggested in 1898, and General Máximo Gómez was quick to label the accusation "one more proof of Spanish perfidy". Exactly one hundred years after the explosion of the U.S. Maine, the Spanish edition of The Miami Herald published an article by the Cuban journalist Carlos Alberto Montaner, where he asks "Who benefitted from the explosion of the 'Maine'?" And to him it is selfevident that it was the Cuban insurgents, who wanted the United States to intervene on their side in their struggle with the royal army in Cuba. 18 The historian Guillermo G. Calleja has arrived at the same conclusion. His thesis (derived from the work of Jorge Navarro Custin) is that the Cuban insurgents placed in the Maine a mine designed by the engineer Federico Blume, who had contacted the Cuban agent Arístides Agüero in Peru. 19 Calleja points out that Captain Sigsbee, of the U.S. Maine, reported to have heard two explosions the night of the event, which supports the thesis of an external explosion which brought about a second one that blew up the magazine of the battleship. According to Calleja, the Cuban magnate Julio Lobo had in his manuscript collection sworn statements by some of the Cuban insurgents who blew up the Maine.
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After a Spanish request for a joint investigation was declined, two investigating commissions were established: one conducted by the U.S. Navy, and the other by authorities in Havana. The Havana commission concluded that the explosion had been caused by internal combustion. The U.S. Navy commission reported on March 21 that there were two explosions: the explosion of a mine beneath the hull that blew the keel upward, and the resulting detonation of the powder stored above. The Spanish government proposed to submit both reports to an arbitration commission, but the United States government refused. After the explosion of the U.S. Maine the intervention of the United States in Cuba was assured.
21
The Road to Armed Intervention by the U.S. in Cuba: "Beggars Should not be Choosers" In spite of the threat by generals Gómez and García Cuban insurgents continued defecting. On March 15, The New York Times reported in the article "Cubans Kill False Leaders" that Cuban insurgent leaders Cayito, Álvarez, and Núñez, had been killed by other insurgents while on their way to tender their submission to the Cuban autonomous government. But most insurgent generals did not pact with the autonomous government after the explosion of the Maine because of the prospect of United States intervention in Cuba, surmised from the appropriation by the United States Congress of $50 million on March 9 for the President to take care of "the national defense". They were encouraged to assume that the Cuban Republic in Arms would be recognized and that the Cuban Liberation Army would be considered a "belligerent" by the official declarations made by the United States government, and by the apparent support of their cause by the people of the United States. On March 28 The New York Times reported, "It can be stated upon high authority that there has been no abatement of the President's intention to see that the war is terminated upon terms that will render the Cuban people practically free. It is not believed that they will accept anything less, nor that the Americans will be satisfied if we should encourage a settlement that would not be acceptable to the Cubans."
On April 2 (p. 2), The New York Times reported in the article "Appeal of Autonomists", an appeal by the Cuban autonomous government to President McKinley, where the Cuban premier is quoted saying, "There are Cubans who accept home rule [...] The Cuban people has the right to have its own government, according to its own wishes and aspirations." In an editorial (p. 8) on that same day, Spain and the Cuban government were insulted. In "Her Time Is Up" (p. 8: 1), the editors of The New York Times say, "Spain does not act as if she meant to fight", and they labeled the appeal of the autonomous government to President McKinley "a comic piece of impudence, which nobody but a Spaniard who was a solemn dunce or a very great wag could have perpetrated." On April 7, the article "Junta Members Excited" quoted Mr. Rubens, the legal advisor of the leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York, saying, "The action of the United States, if it should declare that the Cubans are not in a position to be independent after having a week ago notified Spain that she must recognize the independence of the Cubans as a prerequisite to any further negotiations would place the United States government in a peculiar light." Mr. Rubens said that the government of the Cuban Republic, and the Cuban Liberation Army, would reject the intervention of the United States in Cuba unless it should be preceded by a recognition of the independence of that Republic. But Don Tomás Estrada Palma, and his second-in-command, Gonzalo de Quesada, denied Mr. Rubens' statement. Afterwards Mr. Rubens explained himself. He said that his statement of the previous day meant that the Cuban Liberation Army would fight against United States annexation, but that as far as he was concerned, if Cubans opted for annexation once free from Spain, it was "all well and good". On the same day Mr. Quesada reversed himself as well, now threatening that if the United States intervened without recognizing Cuba's independence it would be making a virtual declaration of war against the insurgents as well as against Spain. But the author of the article "The Junta Members Excited" had judged well the situation concluding that article with the words "beggars should not be choosers".
In an editorial, "The President's Reply", on April 8, President McKinley's reply to a note from the European powers about United States relations with Spain is described. President McKinley had said that the chronic condition in Cuba concerned the United States: there was no government in Cuba, and the United States felt that this deeply injured its interests, that it menaced the tranquility of the United States, and that the carnage in the island shocked the sentiments of humanity. On the front page of its April 10 issue, The New York Times reported that the Spanish government had declared an unilateral armistice in Cuba. Indeed, concerned about a message by President McKinley in early April, the Spanish government declared on April 11 an unilateral armistice in Cuba claiming that it was doing so at the request of the pope. This action delayed hostilities with the United States, but emboldened the insurgents in Cuba, who by this time seem to have decided to rely on an alliance with the United States in order to obtain their goal of independence. On April 17 The New York Times published an article that contradicted the reply by President McKinley to the note of the foreign powers. In the article "Premier Gálvez Replies to Lee", Mr. Gálvez argues that all the official and trade organizations, and all the leading societies in Havana offered their adhesion to the Cuban autonomous government. There were 1,400,000 inhabitants of Cuba who preferred home rule to an insurgent government.
On April 11, President McKinley addressed a message to Congress concluding that United States intervention in Cuba had become necessary, and asked for the authorization to take measures to end the war in the island, and on April 12 The New York Times reported that while opinions differed on this message as a whole, a majority of those questioned by the paper said that the people of Cuba ought to be free. A resolution was voted jointly by the United States Congress on April 18, 1898 stating that the Cuban people ought to be free and independent; that the United States and its government demanded the immediate renunciation by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba and the immediate evacuation of the Spanish government and its armed forces from the island; it gave authority to the President of the United States to use armed force in order to implement the above; and it declared that the United States had no desire or intent of attaining sovereignty in Cuba, except for its pacification, and expressed the intent, once that goal had been achieved, to grant sovereignty and governance over Cuba to her people. 22 On 20 April President McKinley signed this joint resolution, and sent an ultimatum to the Spanish government.
The last clause in the joint resolution of the United States Congress was an amendment made through the offices of Senator Teller of Colorado. Cuban insurgents in the United States and in the island made a lot out of it, but it did not recognize the Cuban Republic in Arms or the Cuban Liberation Army. As a matter of fact, this renunciation did not set any deadline for granting sovereignty over Cuba to her people. Horatio Rubens claimed later that Teller had proposed the amendment at his urging. 23 According to John L. Offner, the lobbyist for the Cuban insurgents Janney and McCook received $2 million in 6 percent Cuban bonds for securing this dubious guarantee of Cuban independence. 24 Hugh Thomas suggests that Teller was acting on behalf of Midwestern beet-sugar interests concerned about competition from Cuban cane-sugar if Cuba became a United States territory and her products could enter the continental United States free of duty. 25 The McKinley administration's initial hostility to the final form of the Joint Resolution gave way to approval as it realized that, because it did not recognize the Cuban Republic or the belligerency of the Cuban Liberation Army, the Teller Amendment did not commit the United States to grant Cuba independence in their time. 26 For months the McKinley administration had kept an active diplomacy with the Spanish government. As soon as one demand was accepted by the Madrid government, Washington showed dissatisfaction and espoused a new one. An editorial in The New York Times on April 16 gives an explanation to what Spanish diplomats found puzzling. In "Keep Up the Pressure", the editors of this newspaper state that all concessions to Cubans had been concessions to the United States, and that pressure upon Spain had to continue until she left Cuba. By April 1898, The New York Times was endorsing armed intervention by the United States in Cuba, but its opinion about Cuban independence was not as clear as it had been on November 15, 1897, when in its editorial pages it had called the Cuban insurgents "brave and desperate men seeking the independence of their island". In the editorial "Recognition", on April 19, The New York Times expresses its opinion that the United States government ought to intervene with force if necessary for the purpose of ending the war in Cuba; but whether the Cuban Republic should be recognized, it believed to be "a question there is a wide difference of opinion".
The U.S. and the Cuban Insurgents: "One Race, Humankind [...] Only Good Nations and Bad" On May 6 The New York Times reported the opening in Havana on the previous day of the Cuban autonomous parliament. This article describes the solemn oath taken by the deputies to defend the sovereignty of the Spanish crown in Cuba, the promise of further concessions to the Cubans made by Governor General Ramón Blanco, and the participation in these ceremonies by the hereto anti-home rule paramilitary corps known as voluntarios. On May 8 The New York Times reported also the definite organization of the Cuban Chamber of Deputies, and five days later it reported in the article "Cuban Congress at Work" that the first political step taken by the Cuban Congress after it was constituted had been to appoint a commission to send -through the Spanish government -to the European powers a protest against the intervention of the United States in Cuban affairs. The Cuban Senate was constituted also, and Mr. José Bruzón was elected as its president.
The article "The Outlook in Havana", published in The New York Times on April 22 ended with another report of the refusal of the Cuban insurgents to confer with a delegation of the Cuban autonomous government. This delegation was empowered to treat with them for peace on the basis of a broader form of home rule, but The New York Times editors suggested that it was not accepted because the insurgents had set their hopes of victory as allies of the United States intervening forces. One month later, on May 23, The New York Times reported news that corroborated that assumption. In the article "Ambitions of the Cubans", Domingo Méndez Capote, vice-president of the Cuban Republic in Arms, is quoted saying, "We feel immensely grateful to the United States for its aid [. In the past half century it has become common opinion that the Cuban insurgents were winning in their struggle against the royalist forces and loyalist Cubans, but reading the war diaries of General Máximo Gómez one gets a different impression. General Máximo Gómez admits his desperate situation on February 28 to the pages of his diary -after the desertion of seventeen men, his force had been reduced to thirty men. On 1 March his force was taken by surprise and barely escaped capture. 29 Proponents of the theory that a conquering Cuban Army of Liberation was cheated of victory by United States intervention will admit that a few insurgents were in favor of intervention, but only among those in exile, and some will add that those were former Autonomists. Nevertheless, the fact is that the propaganda activities of the New York delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (the New York Junta) helped precipitate a war between the United States and Spain. 30 Horatio Rubens was scolded by the Cubans at the headquarters of the Junta in New York after he declared to The New York Times that the Cuban insurgents would oppose armed intervention by the United States in Cuba unless it recognized the independence of the Cuban Republic. 31 But it was not only Cubans in the United States who wanted the United States to intervene in Cuba. Insurgent Cubans on the island did too, and they had their reasons. General Gómez was not winning battles and holding towns on May 2, 1898, when he sent a message asking for assistance to General Sampson through the offices of the United States vice-consul in Sagua; and on May 17 he was unable to take the town of Jicotea after it was abandoned by government troops, because he was out of ammunition and waiting to receive some from "the chief of the allied army". 32 On May 21 he wrote in his diary: "if reinforcements from Oriente do not arrive, it is doubtful the campaign will be successful here." 33 Bartolomé Masó and the government of the Cuban Republic in Arms supported the intervention unconditionally as early as April 28, 1898. 34 On May 1, 1898 General García received a delegation from the United States Army, one of whose members carried a telegram from Don Tomás Estrada Palma, the Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York, and because of that telegram, and because he consulted the Cuban civil government, it has been argued that General García cooperated with the United States armed forces following orders of the government of the Cuban Republic in Arms. 35 But before the Americans went to him with the telegram of introduction from Don Tomás Estrada Palma, General García had expressed his desire to cooperate unconditionally with them in a note dated April 18, 1898. This decision may have been motivated by General García's perception of the Cuban autonomous government as far superior to that of the Cuban Republic in Arms as a civil working government, and therefore more likely to be courted by the Americans once the latter had forced the Spanish crown to cede its sovereignty over Cuba. 37 In a letter of May 1, 1898 to vice-president Méndez Capote, General García announced his taking Bayamo, and claimed that other cities in Oriente were going to fall soon, but he did not answer desperate calls for help from General Gómez three weeks later, on May 21. 38 In a letter dated June 12 to the United States Secretary of the Navy, General Sampson refers to a letter from General García to the American General Miles assuring that officer that he regarded his wishes and suggestions as orders. 39 It seems that Enrique Collazo made a fair assessment of the conduct in 1898 of the New York Delegation, the civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms, and of the two major leaders of the Cuban Liberation Army, when he wrote in 1905 that "delivered to the United States by the civil government and the Delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party abroad, Cubans did not expect liberty to come from the efforts of their army but from the whim or will of the President of the United States." 40 
General Collazo criticizes in his work Los americanos en Cuba
(1905) the civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms and the commanders-in-chief of the Cuban Liberation Army for not negotiating with the Spanish authorities in Cuba and the Cuban autonomous government after the unilateral Spanish cease fire of April 11, and instead giving their unconditional support to the United States government that refused to acknowledge them. 41 In his campaign diary Máximo Gómez records at least three attempts by Governor General Blanco to win him over. Unrecorded in Gómez's diary is a letter from General Blanco dated April 22 which Horatio Rubens translated together with Gómez's answer in his memoir Liberty. The Story of Cuba (1932) . 42 In this letter Governor General Blanco warned the insurgent general that Americans were of a different ethnic origin and wanted to exterminate Cubans because of their Spanish blood with their blockade of the island, which was damaging to both Cubans and Spaniards and would finish the human destruction that mutual depredations during the war of independence had begun. He proposed an alliance of both armies at Santa Clara, where the Cuban insurgents would receive arms from the royal army to fight the Americans, suggesting that once the war was over Spain would welcome Cuba as a new Spanish-speaking nation of the same religion, and the same Spanish blood. General Máximo Gómez answered, indignant, that Cubans and Spaniards could never live in peace together on Cuban soil, and that he knew of only one race, humankind; that for him there were only good nations and bad, and up till then he had reasons for admiring the United States. He concluded saying, "I have written President McKinley and General Miles thanking them for the American intervention in Cuba."
In his narrative of the United States' war with Spain, Trumbull White mentions this exchange between Blanco and Gómez, and commends the insurgent general for his fine sentiments. This American author has nothing but praise for General Máximo Gómez, and expresses his belief that General Blanco's appeal showed the Spaniard to be incapable of appreciating the sentiments which prompted Cubans to maintain their struggle for freedom. He condemns the Spaniard for attempting to stir up within Gómez's breast racial and religious prejudices, and eulogizes the Dominican for the sentiments expressed in the words, "I only believe in one race, mankind", the sentiments of a patriot, and a clean-cut American.
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The New York Times Illustrated Magazine of June 5, 1898 had wide coverage on the United States armed forces going to Cuba. The writeup on the United States Colored Regulars (p. 4) is interesting. Stationed in Tampa, according to the reporter for The New York Times, they had convinced the people of the South that there is a vast difference between classes of non-whites. Tampians had learned to keep their hands off them -even if they did not respect them -although they never lost a chance either by word of mouth or through the columns of the local newspapers to vent their spleen against those African-Americans in uniform. According to the reporter who wrote this article, at that time white southerners would call any African-American a "nigger", no matter whether he be a college graduate, a soldier, or a roustabout on a steamboat. It is ironic that these African-Americans were going to liberate the people in a country where universal (male) suffrage was being exercised, and where a twenty-year old struggle for civil rights had been capped with the granting to Afro-Cubans of the right to bear the honorific "don" before their names. 44 It seems that General Blanco -the Spanish bigot -knew something which Mr. White the clean-cut American -did not know about his own country. Antonio Maceo, the AfroCuban second in command of the Cuban Liberation Army at the beginning of the insurrection in 1895 had opposed United States intervention in Cuba. 45 During a visit to Cuba in 1890, he had rebuked a man at a banquet in his honor who had toasted to the annexation of Cuba to the United States, saying that would be the day when he might be on the side of the Spaniards. 46 Because Maceo was killed in battle on December 7, 1896, we will never know if he would have welcomed United States intervention in Cuba in 1898, like Gómez and García. It is likely that Aguinaldo was given verbal statements of support for the independence of the Philippines by the United States consul in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, and by Commodore Dewey. 48 On June 12 Aguinaldo declared the independence of the Philippines, and on June 23 he decreed the establishment of a provisional government with himself as president. Unlike General García in Cuba, he made no offer to place himself under American orders. 49 When war broke out in April 1898, the immediate action of the United States naval squadrons stationed at Key West since February was to blockade Cuban harbors. On the front page of The New York Times on May 7 the capture on the previous evening of the French steamer Lafayette off Havana harbor while trying to run this blockade was reported. The United states did not begin military operations in Cuba, however, until June 1898, a month after it began them in Asia. On June 2 General Miles sent a message from Tampa to General Calixto García, second-in-command of the Cuban army, in charge of forces in eastern Cuba, and within a week the Cuban insurgent general replied from his base near Bayamo that his forces would actively assist the landing of the United States army, and that he regarded Miles' "wishes and suggestions as orders". No formal agreement had been proposed or was ever entered into between Miles and García, but the latter's response implied that he was voluntarily placing himself and his troops under American direction and control. 50 There was a landing of United States marines in Guantanamo Bay, near the city of that name, but the landing of a 17,000 man expeditionary force of the United States army for the taking of Santiago de Cuba did not begin to take place till June 22, 1898, in Daikiri, after a meeting between García and U.S. Army commander General William R. Shafter on June 20. It had the assistance of the Cuban Liberation Army, who had also carried out a diversion at Cabañas. In addition, the mere presence of local insurgent forces acted as a constraint upon the movement of royalist troops throughout the military division of Santiago de Cuba.
The Cuban Liberation Army made important contributions to the Santiago campaign, but United States troops soon developed an attitude of contempt for their nominal allies. In his war account, The Rough Riders (1899), Colonel Theodore Roosevelt says, "There was a Cuban guide at the head of the column, but he ran away as soon as the fighting began -two American reporters there were two men who did not run away." 52 This dismissal of Cubans as cowardly is one of many negative comments about the courage and fighting caliber of the insurgents the United States had gone to war for in Mr. Roosevelt's memoirs. In his account of fighting at El Caney he describes Cubans "scattering like guinea pigs". 53 Roosevelt was particularly unimpressed by the appearance of the Cuban Liberation Army at the moment he landed in Cuba, when, he says, "At Daikiri we found hundreds of Cuban insurgents, a crew as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes ever looked on, armed with every kind of rifle in all stages of dilapidation. It was evident at a glance, that they would be no use in serious fighting, but it was hoped that they might be of service in scouting. From a variety of causes, however, they turned out to be nearly useless, even for this purpose, so far as the Santiago campaign was concerned."
54 Ironically, Colonel Roosevelt praises the "Spanish guerrillas", unaware that this force in the royal army in Cuba was overwhelmingly Cuban-born. 55 Mr. Roosevelt was not the only American in Cuba who thought poorly of the Cuban insurgents. George Kennan wrote in 1899 that opinion among United States officers differed about the Cuban insurgents who had joined the United States marines in Guantanamo. 56 He was not impressed favorably by the appearance of 1.500 insurgents under General García in Siboney -"fully four-fifths of them were mulattoes or blacks; the number of half-grown boys was very large; there was hardly a suggestion of a uniform in the whole command, most of them being barefoot [...] they looked worse than the clothes that a New England farmer hangs on a couple of sticks to scare away the crows." 57 But while Mr. Kennan did not mean to say that those "ragamuffins" were not brave men and good soldiers, General S.B.M. Young said, "The insurgents are a lot of degenerates, absolutely devoid of honor and gratitude. They are no more capable of self-government than the savages of Africa." 58 The poor impression given by the physical appearance of the Cubans seemed confirmed by the failure of General García's insurgents to prevent the entrance of reinforcements from Holguin into Santiago, and General Shafter reported this failure of the Cuban to Washington. 59 General García continued cooperating with the United States Army commander, but relations between the two men deteriorated after that incident.
On July 4, the small Spanish fleet, which had been trapped inside Santiago's bottle-necked harbor, attempted to escape, and was sunk in the effort. The city of Santiago would not capitulate unconditionally though, and negotiations began between the Spanish commander of the city, José Toral, and United States Army commander General Shafter. The latter feared that taking Santiago would be very costly in human lives, and also that a long siege would allow the spread of tropical diseases among his unacclimated men. 60 On July 14 General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army in the city as well as all government troops and divisions in the eastern province of Cuba. The United States made the commitment to repatriate all the soldiers from Spain who would want to return. 61 The terms of surrender stipulated that incumbent civil officers and local constabulary authorities were to be ratified in their positions, and that all residents of the province passed directly under the authority and protection of the United States. 62 In the article "Santiago and After", The New York Times on July 17, 1898 encouraged the conquest of Puerto Rico because "no better time would be chosen for that capture than the moment at which the Span-ish Minister of War is talking of the retention of that island as an indispensable condition of peace." It concluded that "the intolerable nuisance which the war was undertaken to abate cannot be perpetuated in Puerto Rico", and that "Spanish rule must be banished completely and unconditionally from our hemisphere." These words echo what Theodore Roosevelt said later in his The Rough Riders: "I preached with all the fervor and zeal I possessed, our duty to intervene in Cuba, and to take this opportunity of driving the Spanish from the Western World." 63 But in Santiago de Cuba the United States regulars fraternized with their erstwhile enemies, the Spaniards. Officers and privates in the United States Army and Navy could be seen in the city together with Spaniards of their own rank. A lieutenant in the United States army later reminisced, "I met many of the Spanish officers in the restaurants of the city, and I must admit that they were, as a rule, capital fellows, kindly disposed, hospitable, and very gentlemanly." 64 The Spaniards reciprocated the feelings of the Americans for them. Before departing for Europe, the Spanish private Pedro López de Castillo wrote a letter of appreciation to the American Army which was signed by 11,000 Spanish soldiers. The Spanish soldiers wished the Americans "all happiness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood"; and concluded, "these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities." 65 General Shafter excluded General García from the peace negotiations, and the insurgent army from capitulation ceremonies. On July 14 García learned that his forces would neither share in the municipal administration of Santiago nor receive control of Cuban territory. He demanded from Shafter a clarification of the status of Santiago and learned that the Cuban Liberation Army would not be permitted into the city. He refused the personal invitation to attend the capitulation ceremonies at Santiago extended to him by Shafter, and after breaking publicly with the Americans, he forwarded to General Máximo Gómez a formal protest of American actions accompanied by his resignation. 66 General Shafter answered General García's protest, and reminded him that the war was between the United States and Spain. 67 On July 26 The New York Times reported in the article "The Cuban Complaints" the circumstances surrounding the differences between General García and General Shafter at Santiago. This article concludes with the words, "in our view there is at present no government of Cuba, but there is a municipal government of Santiago de Cuba", and "to keep Cuban troops out was a necessity", because "when our men are compelled to shell our allies in order to induce them to desist from killing prisoners, we have had sufficient notice of what would be the result of letting them lose upon a captive town." 68 In the same issue the article "The Future of Cuba" ponders that the joint resolution of Congress declared it to be its intention to leave the government and control of the island to its people, but that it might be that the Cubans wished to exercise their right of control to become United States citizens.
Hostilities between the United States and Spain ended formally on August 12 -although the capture of Manila by United States forces was staged on August 13. Since the Cuban insurgents were not signatories to the peace protocol, insurgent armies continued operations, and the United States appealed to the Delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York to call them to order. Don Tomás Estrada Palma, the Delegate, accepted the peace protocol, and his decision was subsequently accepted by the civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms. 69 Talk of renewing the war against the United States went on among the Cuban insurgent armed bands, but they had neither weapons nor supplies; nor the means to purchase them, because those came to the insurgents through the Cuban Revolutionary Party juntas in the United States. 70 On August 13 General García was dismissed by the civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms for establishing a military dictatorship in eastern Cuba, and in early September it authorized the disbandment of the entire eastern army. In late September it called for a National Assembly to meet at Santa Cruz del Sur, and on October 23 it formally dissolved itself and invested the Santa Cruz del Sur Assembly as the provisional supreme authority of the Republic of Cuba.
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General H. L. Lawton replaced General Shafter as provincial governor in eastern Cuba, and upon his arrival in Cuba he had a conference with General García, where he convinced the Cubans that the United States intended to honor the terms of the Joint Resolution, but that Cuban cooperation was essential to the success of the congressional pledge. By September 27, García was giving his support to the Americans because he despised the Santa Cruz Assembly more. His denunciation of the provisional government and his endorsement of United States authorities in Cuba served to legitimize the refusal by the latter to recognize the authority of the Santa Cruz Assembly. 72 On October 1, 1898, The New York Times reported that while former United States Consul General at Havana Fitzhugh Lee avowed that Cuba would secure its independence and be fitted for it under a "not long guardianship [...]", this seemed a somewhat premature confidence.
In the article "An Envoy in Disguise" on October 9, The New York Times chastised Cuban supporters of the Cuban autonomous government, because Mr. Rivero, editor of the senior Havana daily El diario de la Marina, was in New York seeking a rapprochement between Cuban supporters of home rule under the Spanish crown and Cuban exiles in New York who supported Cuban independence. The New York Times wondered how much credence the Cubans in New York would give to "the myth that the Autonomists are anything else than a group of Spaniards who for years have been the worse of foes to the real patriots of the island". This article concludes that the pretense of an autonomous Cuban government had been revived for the plain purpose of embarrassing the pending negotiations between the United States and Spain, and that the disguised royalists were posing as the representatives of a phase of Cuban sentiment. The fact is that, despite the predictions of The New York Times since October 1897, the Cuban autonomous government continued functioning after the war of the United States with Spain began. On June 22 (p. 1: 5), in the article "Galvez Hopes for Spain", The New York Times reported an address of the Cuban Prime Minister, where he said that he rather saw heavens fall than an invasion of Cuba by a foreign army. At the Cuban Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Gálvez had repeatedly said that home rule was not a regime to benefit the Cuban-born Creole, nor the European-born only, but for all the inhabitants of the island of Cuba. It is puzzling that one of the better informed newspapers in the United States did not know that the Cuban autonomous government continued operating outside of eastern Cuba after the capitulation of Santiago in July, and the cessation of hostilities between Spain and the United States in August. It existed until the end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba on December 31, 1898. 73 Whatever individual former Autonomists may have said or done after 1898, the fact is that the Cuban Liberal (home rule) Party was the only Cuban political group opposed to United States intervention in Cuba in that fateful year.
Contrary to the opinion of The New York Times, the Autonomists were not a group of Spaniards, but Cubans who remained loyal to the Spanish crown during the war of Cuban independence, and undertook the task of organizing a government when home rule was attained by Cuba in 1898. 74 The New York Times itself had reported in April 1898 the elections being held in Cuba for deputies to the insular parliament, and the support given to that government by all the influential institutions at Havana. Far from being posers or job-seekers, the members of the Cuban autonomous government were well known professionals, scholars, and men of integrity, highly commended by the last Governor General of Cuba, Adolfo Jiménez-Castellanos, for their willingness to remain at their post and continue the administration of the twothirds of Cuba not under United States military administration at a time when serving under the Spanish flag could endanger the future of anyone planning to remain in Cuba. 75 This author is not the only one who thinks that an autonomous Cuban state offered the best hope for a peaceful solution of the problems of Cuba, and might have preserved the island and its people from the disconcerting and ambiguous experiences of the intervention and the military occupation of Cuba by the United States of America. 76 By November 1898 the United States authorities in Cuba had become arbiters of contending factions among the Cuban insurgents. In that month the Santa Cruz Assembly sent a commission to Washington, D.C., and General García traveled also to the United States in order to present a case for its dissolution. On December 29 General Gómez broke what had been a long silence to address the remains of the Cuban Liberation Army, appealing for reconciliation and unity. Calixto García had died that month in the United States, and Don Tomás Estrada Palma suggested to the United States authorities to give Gómez some official attention. In January 1899 President McKinley sent a special representative to General Máximo Gómez, who accepted to cooperate in disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army, and distributing $3 million to the insurgent soldiers. 77 Soon after, the Santa Cruz Assembly denounced Gómez's actions, and threatened to deprive him of the moral authority necessary to implement the dissolution of the Liberation Army. But the United States Military Governor of Cuba, Brooke, dissolved the Assembly by decree, and General Gómez, acting under the authority of the United States government, disbanded the Cuban Liberation Army. 78 These events made it clear that with United States intervention the Cuban war of independence had become a Spanish American War. 79 
CONCLUSION
Cuban historian Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring debunked the myth that Cubans received independence from the United States in his monograph Cuba no debe su independencia a los Estados Unidos (1950), but in this work he devised his own myth of a Cuban Liberation Army on the road to victory. 80 He was instrumental in bringing about an official proclamation of the Cuban Academy of History designating the War of the United States with Spain a "Spanish-Cuban-American War", a concept that, in my opinion, ignores the fact that the United States government never granted belligerent status to the Cuban Liberation Army, that the United States armed forces marginalized the Cuban army as soon as they were established in Cuba (never treating the Cuban insurgents as allies), and that, for all practical purposes, the intervention of the United States in Cuba in 1898 was part of a war of the United States with Spain which began at Manila Bay in April 1898. The way things seem to have actually been is best described by General Shafter's answer to General García's protest. Shafter said, "This war, as you well know, is between the United States and Spain alone." 81 It is likely that without United States armed intervention in 1898 home rule would have become established in Cuba, and eventually Cuba would have become independent peacefully. But instead of a peace between Cubans, a peace treaty between the United States and Spain was signed in Paris on December 10, 1898.
82 Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring was correct, however, denying that the United States had gone to war with Spain in order to aid the Cuban Republic in Arms. This is confirmed by contemporary sources such as The New York Times.
From October 1897 to October 1898 the opinions expressed in the editorials and in the reporting of The New York Times about Cuba and the Cubans changed considerably. In 1897 this newspaper applauded the reluctance of the Cuban insurgents to accept anything less than in-dependence from Spain. Throughout the year 1898 the negative opinion that The New York Times held of Spain did not change, and its editorials on the Cuban autonomous government were consistently pessimistic (concerning articles about the Cuban autonomous government, though it is remarkable the contrast between the consistent condemnation from before its inception in editorials with the factual news articles from its reporters in Cuba, who consistently described a working government with support from Cuban society). But in 1898 there was a considerable change in opinion about Cubans and Cuban independence. By April Cuban insurgents demanding a commitment to Cuban independence from the United States as it threatened intervention in Cuba were reminded by The New York Times that beggars should not be choosers. On 26 July, this newspaper expressed doubts about the capability of Cubans for self-government, and suggested that Cubans might want to become United States citizens.
The articles in The New York Times in 1898 mentioned above refer directly or indirectly to two subjects that became important in the relations of the United States with Cubans after its war with Spain: annexationism (collaborationism), and the development of Cuba by United States capital and entrepreneurs (economic dependence). On these issues the posture of The New York Times after the war contrasts with what this newspaper wrote when the hegemonic power in Cuba was Spain. Under Spain it demanded freedom for Cubans, while under the United States it showed alarm at the enfranchisement of all the male adult population in the island. Under Spain it encouraged the Cuban insurgents to intransigence -as brave men -, but under the United States it encouraged them to acquiesce to become wards.
